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Abstract 
 
Thinking about the representational qualities of maps and models allows one to offer a new perspective on 
the nature of mindreading. The recent critiques of our dominant paradigms for mindreading, theory theory 
and simulation theory, by enactivists such as Daniel Hutto reveal a flaw in the standard options for thinking 
about how we think about others. Views that rely on theorizing or simulation to account for the way in 
which we understand others often appear to over-intellectualize social interaction. In contrast, enactivists 
champion embodied, non-representational forms of engagement with others. I claim that one can improve 
on representational views of social cognition by moving away from talk of the mental manipulation of 
propositions in favor of the construction of maps and models of others. Furthermore, I claim that the current 
state of social neurobiology lends itself to such a view. 
  
     
 
 
Introduction 
 
The interdisciplinary debate over how we come to understand the mental states of others has 
presumed that the output of so-called “mindreading” activity is a representation. One might 
argue over whether the representation in question emerges from theorizing, simulation, or 
something else, but there has hitherto been relative agreement that coming to understand 
another person involves coming to represent her mental doings. Relatively recently, a 
family of views has emerged as an alternative to theories that share the assumption of some 
form of representationalism. The most common label for these views is “enactivism”.  
 
A distinguishing feature of the enactivist camp is a repudiation of representational theories 
of social cognition and often representational theories of the mind in general. How 
thoroughgoing an enactivist’s rejection of representation is will depend on the theorist. 
Essays Philos (2014)15:2                                                                                                                 Green | 280 
 
 
 
Enactivists as a tribe claim that (some) important work typically predicated of 
representations is done by some kind of embodied state instead of by representations. What 
is meant by “embodied state” and the preferred nomenclature for picking out embodied 
states can vary, but proponents of the view contrast these embodied states with 
representational ones. In this essay, I will examine the enactivist challenge as presented in 
Daniel Hutto’s 2008 monograph Folk Psychological Narratives, as his enactivism is one of 
the most thoroughgoing ones on offer and is overtly applied to the topic of mindreading.1 I 
will then present a representational account that learns the lessons enactivism has to teach 
us without repudiating representations. 
 
1. Hutto on Intentional Attitudes 
 
On Daniel Hutto’s view, one should reserve the term “mindreading” for the use of folk 
psychology to make sense of the actions of others in terms of reasons.2 Hutto doesn’t think 
this kind of mindreading does much of the work of allowing us to navigate social interactions. 
What does this work are “intentional attitudes” that do not involve mental representation. 
 
Mindreading, for Hutto, is a kind of narrative practice. Humans tell stories that make sense 
of the actions of others in terms of their beliefs, desires, and the like in language. This, says 
Hutto, is all there is to mindreading (Hutto 2008, 4). In fact, in Hutto’s opinion, the primary 
purpose of folk psychology is more nearly “mindtelling” than mindreading. We tell stories 
to others that make ourselves comprehensible when other people would be unable to 
respond appropriately to our behavior otherwise (Hutto 2008, 5ff.). Mindreading is 
sociocultural, and, according to Hutto, it does not have the deep biological basis that 
alternative theories of mindreading might think it does (cf. Hutto 2008, ix-x). 
 
Hutto is aware of much of the literature having to do with mirror neurons, cognitive 
development, and autism marshaled by participants in the mindreading debate. He thinks 
that these findings are consistent with the presence of intentional attitudes that are not 
representational. One can be in a state that is directed at the mental state of another person 
without that state being a representation of the other person’s mental state or having a 
representation as a part. According to Hutto, the empirical evidence only supports the 
biological undergirding of intentional attitudes simpliciter, not intentional attitudes that 
happen to also be representational. One does not need to represent the presence of 
something to be responsive to it. One can instinctively react to something without doing 
so because one has represented it in some manner that licenses that reaction (e.g., the 
startle reflex). 
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Hutto thinks that our normal means of navigating the social sphere is like a sophisticated set 
of reflexes. One’s responses to social stimuli can be refined and trained. Nevertheless, Hutto 
thinks that social interactions depend on instinctive responses to stimuli, not information 
structures. He summarizes his view as follows.  
 
Our primary modes of interpersonal engagement are not driven by mentalistic 
predictions or explanations, rather they are characterized by the possession of 
embodied expectations. Such expectations are not intellectual products; arguably 
they are not the outcomes of the manipulation of representations by inferential 
operations at all—but, certainly they do not involve the manipulation or 
representation of propositional attitudes. Like most creatures, our basic dealings 
with others are more visceral; we get by with scriptlike patterns of recognition-
response, some of which can be quite sophisticated and complex. . . . [W]ell-
calibrated social activity only involves a capacity to selectively respond to end-
directed intentional attitudes that are revealed in the expressions of others; these 
expressive attitudes are unlike those of the propositional variety. For this reason, 
among others, these primary modes of interacting with others should not be 
classified as a species of mindreading. (Hutto 2008, 3) 
 
Hutto maintains that “basic embodied responding is not content-involving” (Hutto 2008, 
45). One’s social reflexes cannot be explanations of anything. They do not of themselves 
pick out a proposition or bear logical relations to propositions any more than the startle 
reflex does. They do not refer to the stimuli that trigger them. In short, Hutto thinks that 
responding to a stimulus is not, of itself, sufficient for that response having semantic 
properties or anything like such properties. A response can be apt relative to its trigger 
without there being some kind of resemblance relation between the internal structure of the 
response and the thing eliciting the response. 
 
What successful responding depends on is the existence of a correlation between 
specific signs and distal states of affairs. These hold good often enough, at least in 
the historically normal environments of organisms. But the signs themselves do no 
declarative work, nor are they interpreted as doing such by organisms or their 
perceptual mechanisms when they respond to them appropriately in discharging 
their proper functions. It is not as if one part of the system in any sense tells another 
that “this is how things stand” in the process. (Hutto 2008, 48-49) 
 
Natural selection privileges some social responses to the environment and not others. To be 
subject to natural selection, a behavior only needs to covary with the conditions that make 
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that behavior adaptive. Covariance, of course, does not entail representation. Among other 
things, covariance is symmetrical and representation either is not or, at the least, need not be 
(Hutto 2008, 48-49). 
 
Before turning to critique, let me draw attention to a valuable insight to which I think 
Hutto draws our attention. One way to re-state Hutto’s main point is that subconscious 
“know-how” can explain a lot of our social interactions, and it can do so without it being 
obvious that know-how requires a representation. After all, know-how embedded in a 
reflex seems capable of operating completely subconsciously while seeming to have some 
kind of intentionality. 
 
It is plausible that knowing another person is both causally and developmentally dependent 
on lots of know-how. One way of glossing the increasingly complex series of interactions 
that occur between infant and caregiver in the first year of life is in terms of know-how. An 
infant emerges from the womb with an instinct for interacting with others. Within minutes 
of birth, an infant can imitate the facial expression of another person (cf. Meltzoff & Moore 
1977). Taking advantage of this imitative impulse, the caregiver models more complex 
social behavior and gradually the infant is able to master the behavior being modeled. The 
caregiver is teaching the infant what to do when interacting with others. It would be 
unintuitive to say that what explains imitation in neonates is an ability to understand 
propositions about the caregiver’s mind. It is only slightly more intuitive to claim the 
neonate understands what the person he or she is imitating is doing. Rather, the infant 
appears to have an instinct or reflex for imitation, and this instinct is developed and refined 
as one develops. 
 
Similarly, one way of thinking about an autistic person’s social deficits is as an impairment 
in engaging in the behavior of relating to another person. Autistic persons often act as if 
they have wandered out onto the stage of a play without knowing the script. It is not that the 
high-functioning autistic person lacks the requisite mentalistic concepts so much as the 
ability to use them productively. They simply don’t know how social interaction works. For 
instance, in her autobiography, Temple Grandin states:  
 
I do not read subtle emotional cues. I have had to learn by trial and error what 
certain gestures and facial expressions mean. When I started my career, I often made 
initial contacts on the telephone, which was easier because I did not have to deal 
with complex social signals. (Grandin 2006, 156) 
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Grandin is not suffering from a misunderstanding of the concept of emotion so much as a 
know-how deficit. She does not know how to take part in the activity of giving and 
receiving social signals, but she is able to communicate effectively about the mental aspect 
of the interactions she has trouble with. 
 
The enactivist picks up on the insight that social interaction is first and foremost an activity, 
and to do the activity one needs know-how. The lack of an emphasis on know-how renders 
alternatives such as theory theory and simulation theory over-intellectualized in the eyes of 
the enactivist. Theory theory posits the ability to think in a quasi-scientific way, and 
simulation theory posits an ability to reconstruct the subjective world of another person 
imaginatively. The enactivist, by contrast, need only appeal to one’s ability to pair a 
stimulus with an appropriate response. 
 
It is far from obvious, however, that eschewing representation is necessary in order to take 
advantage of the insights Hutto provides. When Hutto discusses mental representations, he 
conducts his discussion as if anything that was a mental representation would also be a 
propositional attitude, and he seems to think that the only way we represent propositions is 
through sentences. 3  Since the social interactions of nonverbals are, by definition, not 
conducted through the exchange of sentences, Hutto thinks that these interactions do not 
produce or depend on mental representations. Thus, when even verbal beings engage in the 
sort of behavior that a nonverbal being could engage in, one should not assume 
representations are involved. 
 
Hutto’s fixation on propositions may blind him to the case for there being non-propositional 
representations involved at the level of “mere” intentional attitudes. A divide between 
propositional attitudes and states that merely covary with the environment in a non-
representational manner ignores many candidates for mental representation that don’t 
appear to be propositional in form. Imagery, for example, is not propositional. It does not 
possess the semantic properties unique to propositions that Hutto is thinking of as 
individuating representations. 
 
Notice, however, that mental imagery does not merely covary with what is imaged, or, at 
least, we do not typically expect covariance to be the deepest explanation of the similarity 
between an image and what is imaged. Rather, imagery has an internal structure that 
typically is meant to correspond in some way to what is imaged. As enactivist theories of 
perception are quick to point out, sensory imagery arises from a constructive, selective 
process imbued with know-how (Noe 2006). Perception is not the mere passive registration 
of what is imprinted on the senses like a seal in wax.  
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How close the resemblance of an image to an object needs to be to count as a successful 
correspondence is a hard question to answer, but we are familiar with cases where imagery 
covaries with a stimulus without counting as an image of that stimulus, such as in the case 
of synesthesia. The person with synesthesia might associate a certain color with a day of the 
week, but red imagery does not count as being imagery of Tuesdays just because there is a 
measure of covariance between red imagery and thoughts of Tuesdays. It may become a 
symbol for Tuesdays as one learns that one can impose a meaning on this co-varying 
relationship, but the experience of synesthesia lacks that kind of thick intentionality that 
sensory imagery typically features. To use a more controlled example, if one’s “historic 
normal environment” included an evil demon who flashed a mental image of a scary but 
physically impossible animal whenever it was adaptive for one to feel wary, the image 
would still not count as an image of a diverse set that includes rickety bridges, C-grade 
restaurants, and Greeks bearing gifts. 
 
If mental imagery can serve a representational function, it is less clear that know-how is 
always devoid of representational content for the simple reason that know-how seems often 
to involve or rely on using various kinds of imagery to carry information. Researchers of the 
neurobiology of movement even see the need to posit “motor imagery” to accommodate 
their empirical data, an information structure that stores motor information independently of 
its being used to produce an action (cf. Gallagher 2008, 69). 
 
When an action needs to be monitored and directed, one appears to imagine the movement 
and its execution using the same brain areas that would be carrying out the action. One 
guides the action by matching sensory, proprioceptive, vestibular, and efference feedback 
against the motor imagery that serves as the plan one is trying to execute. One then adjusts 
one’s further movements in accordance with the way in which feedback does or does not fit 
the image of what one is trying to do. The use of motor imagery is always at least partly 
subconscious, but it does not fit neatly with the folk concept of reflex as a blind reaction to a 
stimulus. Such reflexes there may well be, but know-how is a wider class that encompasses 
many abilities that appear to involve information structures such as sensory and motor 
imagery that need to encode something about the way the world is and the way we can act 
in it in order for us to have those abilities. 
 
Denying that embodied interactions traffic in information structures about the other person 
appears to rob one of an essential criterion in determining whether know-how is present in 
some of even the simplest social interactions. Navigating social interactions involves more 
than reacting to the body configurations of others with adaptive body configurations of 
one’s own. It requires reacting to what those body configurations mean. If one happened to 
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run away from all aggressors because one found the facial expressions aggressors make 
ugly, one would not be engaging in successful social cognition. One would be varying one’s 
behavior in an adaptive manner in response to the social environment, but one would still be 
interacting unskillfully. Adaptive covariance does not a mindreader make, but it also does 
not appear to be sufficient for much of the social cognition that we accomplish without any 
noticeable reliance on propositions. Hutto is free to claim that the intentional attitudes he 
has in mind covary with stimuli in a way that is not merely adaptive, but it is hard to see 
how he will get the right level of specificity in the intentional attitude without an appeal to 
an information structure that counts as a representation. 
 
In sum, Hutto helpfully draws our attention to the importance of know-how and the way in 
which social interaction is an activity we engage in rather than an intellectual operation. 
Nevertheless, there is reason to wish for a less radical alternative that can accommodate 
some of Hutto’s insights. In the next section, I will lay the groundwork for such a positive 
account using some insights from the philosophy of science on the representational features 
of maps and models. 
 
2. Giere on Maps and Models 
 
Observing the differences between kinds of non-mental representation can be useful for 
thinking through the possible forms that mental representations might take. Ultimately, I 
will argue that we can make progress towards understanding what it would mean to 
represent another person by reflecting on the ways that maps and models represent things. 
In this section, I will be exploring the representational qualities of maps and models using 
Ronald Giere’s views in the philosophy of science as a guide (Giere 2006). 
 
Scientific perspectives, for Giere, are composed of models that represent some particular 
domain, and scientific practice is a matter of constructing, applying, and correcting these 
models. A model may use words, but it may also use numbers, graphs, images, or three-
dimensional constructions. The aims of a scientific investigation might be satisfied by 
producing an end product of any of these forms so long as the model produced fits what is 
being modeled in relevant respects. Moreover, models can be more or less specific or 
general. One might have a mathematical model that represents a set of data on grasshopper 
migration patterns that supports a more general model of insect migration that is related to a 
still more general model of migratory behavior that supports a still more general model, and 
so on (cf. Giere 2006, 61, fig. 4.1). 
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There are many affinities between Giere’s work and the project of finding the right vehicle 
for information about other people. Scientific perspectives may adequately characterize 
many features of a domain that are left out of other perspectives including other equally 
valid scientific perspectives. Equally good models may vary dramatically according to the 
tools being used to construct and apply them or the features the models focus on. Perhaps 
most importantly for present purposes, Giere’s view provides a way to capture objective but 
perspectival phenomena in a way that does not require propositions. So it is, I will argue, 
with our knowledge of other people. 
 
For example, a scientific investigation of a certain stretch of sea floor could produce a 
topographic map, a computer simulation of plate tectonic activity, photographic 
documentation of the state of sea floor life, a graphic representation of the flux of local fish 
populations, and so on. Each of these may be the products of a valid scientific undertaking 
and may exemplify scientific knowledge about the same stretch of sea floor. Nonetheless, 
each scientific product is the result of a different way of examining the same domain and 
produces a very different kind of result. The results produced will have some sort of 
interesting relationship with related propositions and scientific theorizing conducted through 
sentences that pick out propositions. Plausibly, however, a map or a model that results from 
a scientific endeavor need not itself contain or make reference to propositions. 
 
For Giere, models are abstract representations that are intended to bear a relationship of 
similarity with some particular feature(s) of a target domain (Giere 2006, 63). Maps are 
physical objects that bear a relationship of similarity with the spatial distribution of some 
particular feature(s) of a target domain (Giere 2006, 72). For Giere, then, models and maps 
are related, though the nature of the relation is left somewhat vague (Giere 2006, 76ff.). 
They are not related in the manner of genus and species because models are supposed to be 
abstract in the very respect that maps are supposed to be concrete. Maps might be thought of 
as physical manifestations of models, but, if so, then maps as Giere conceives of them could 
not be the only possible manifestations. A graph of a bell curve can depict the distribution 
of red-headed persons in a locale without there being some set of red-headed objects shaped 
like a curve out in space-time somewhere. 
 
Similarity is a fitting evaluative metric for a perspectival phenomenon. Similarity is 
feature relative. To say of two objects that they are similar, one must specify in what 
respect they are similar. One can find ways in which very similar objects are dissimilar 
and ways in which very dissimilar objects are similar. Moreover, what counts as similar or 
similar enough can depend on one’s practical interests without similarity thereby 
collapsing into a social construction. If we are looking for someone to impersonate Seth at 
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work, Danny will count as dissimilar because Seth and Danny do not look alike even 
though they may count as similar in numerous other respects due to having similar beliefs, 
desires, and mannerisms. 
 
Similarity also comes in degrees. One of the motivations for calling a phenomenon 
perspectival is that different ways of approaching a domain yield different kinds of 
information, but another can be that different ways of approaching something might count 
as successful at different degrees of correspondence. The very same description of what a 
person is wearing may be impressive coming from an observer on the other side of a 
crowded room but woeful from someone doing her observing from close range. 
 
Models and maps do not merely stand in a similarity relationship to what they are about. All 
things resemble each other in various respects. A map of Washington D.C. may resemble 
Washington D.C. in the way it distributes the symbols that are supposed to stand for the 
buildings in Washington D.C. The map and the city, however, also resemble each other by 
being physically extended, by being self-identical, by not having existed at the time of the 
Caesars, and so on. Furthermore, one might well think that the map resembles other maps of 
Washington D.C. more than it resembles the city of Washington D.C. Yet, we are not 
tempted to say that the map of Washington D.C. represents these other maps.  
 
Giere appeals to “agent-based similarity” as what allows maps and models to represent 
(Giere 2006, 63). 
 
Note that I am not saying that the model itself represents an aspect of the world 
because it is similar to that aspect. There is no such simple representational 
relationship. Anything is similar to anything else in countless respects, but surely not 
everything by itself represents something else. It is not the model that is doing the 
representing; it is the scientists using the model who are doing the representing. One 
way scientists do this is by picking out some specific features of the model that are 
then claimed to be similar in some specific respect to features of the designated real 
system. . . . Part of using a model to represent some aspect of the world is being able 
to pick out the relevantly similar features. Another part of using a model to represent 
something is having some reasonable idea of how good a fit might be expected. 
(Giere 2006, 63-64) 
 
What Giere has in mind will be clearest if we focus on maps. One of the ways in which 
maps represent is by being partial (Giere 2006, 73). Unlike a photograph, which may show 
many extraneous details of what it is a photograph of, the act of constructing a map already 
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involves a selection of a subset of the phenomena that is relevant to the purposes the map 
might be put to. The map intentionally leaves out many of the features of the phenomena 
being mapped, and what remains is usually intentionally selected for. 
 
The accuracy of some features of a map may be compromised for the sake of making a map 
easier to use. An example that Giere uses is that of the Mercator map of the Earth, which 
distorted the relative sizes of the Earth’s land masses (e.g., making Greenland look larger 
than it is). The introduction of inaccuracy in the Mercator map was the cost of creating a 
map that was easier to use for navigation (Giere 2006, 78). The Mercator map represents the 
earth due to a relationship of similarity, but it employs strategic inaccuracies so as to make 
it maximally usable. 
 
Maps convey information through both a spatial similarity to what is mapped and the 
conventions that explicitly or implicitly apply to using a map (cf. Giere 2006, 73ff.). A rail 
map is given a particular hook-like shape so as to correspond to the shape of the actual rail 
line. The map conveys more information than the rough shape of the rail line, however. The 
implicit conventions of map use further dictate that the white circles placed on the rail line 
are over-sized symbols for the locations of rail stations and that the words on the map are 
the names of the locations of those stations. The spatial similarity of the map to the rail line 
allows one to superimpose symbols that enhance the information that the map can convey. 
Once one has mastered the conventions of the map, for example, one can know that the 
distance between Tottenham Hale and Finsbury Park is not as great as that between 
Finsbury Park and Brixton. The implicit conventions can be rendered explicit with such 
features as a key that explains what symbols stand for. 
 
Agent-based similarity for a model is similarity among a certain range of features that are 
selected for in the making (or selecting) of that model. Agent-based similarity for a model 
should be the same as that for a map only adjusted to apply to a more abstract kind of 
representation. Feature selection may result from restricting the content of the model or 
altering the structure of the representational medium so as to emphasize the chosen features. 
The similarity is most fundamentally between the structure of the representational medium 
and what is being represented. This structure may be enhanced by tying secondary 
representational features such as symbols to parts of it. One expects feature selection to be 
rooted in the possible uses for which the map or model is constructed. 
 
Notice that maps and models may be intimately tied to know-how and to one’s expectations 
for how what is mapped will change under various conditions of interaction. One of the 
things a tourist map does that a list of written instructions for approaching tourist sites does 
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not necessarily do is give one a sense of the way the terrain in question would unfold under 
many different ways of exploring it. A map gives one a sense of what to expect from one’s 
interaction with that environment relative to the features of the environment drawn attention 
to. The map presumes that one knows how to use the map, how to interpret its conventions 
or its key. The explanation for what features are included in the map will often be that the 
map empowers one to do certain kinds of things in that environment. 
 
3. A Positive Account: Maps, Models, and Mirror Neurons 
 
My suggestion is that knowledge of persons is model-like and that it is built up out of the 
map-like outputs of what are called “mirror neurons” and more traditionally recognized 
sensory processing areas. Social cognition is representational insofar as maps and models 
are representational, but, much like the maps and models we are familiar with, the 
representational medium in question is essentially bound up with know-how. I claim that 
the literature on mirror neurons provides a powerful motivation for an account of 
representing others in terms of models.4 
 
Mirror neurons were discovered when an Italian lab demonstrated that one section of the 
monkey’s premotor cortex called “F5” had special properties (Matelli, Luppino, & 
Rizzolatti 1985; Rizzolatti, Camarda, Fogassi, Gentilucci, Luppino, & Matelli 1988). In one 
of the first experiments with mirror neurons, the brains of monkeys were monitored during a 
variety of circumstances involving picking up a small edible object (cf. Gallese, Fadiga, 
Fogassi, & Rizzolatti 1996). Scientists observed F5 while a monkey picked up the object 
but also observed F5 when the monkey watched a human or another monkey pick up the 
object. Interestingly, some neurons were active in all these circumstances. These neurons 
were not active when observing a human pick up an object with a tool, such as a pair of 
pliers. The neurons in question responded only to observed actions that closely resembled 
the way the monkey would act in the place of the other. The neurons “mirrored” an 
observed action within the watching monkey’s motor system (Fogassi & Gallese 2002, 16). 
 
These experiments with gripping an object revealed an overlap between the motor and 
sensory systems of the monkey. What was noteworthy about this particular overlap was that 
it showed a motor process in another person could be immediately registered through an 
equivalent motor process in oneself. In fact, the monkey’s mirror neurons are sensitive to 
the goal of a visible action, and different mirror neurons can vary in how specific a 
combination of action and goal they track. For example, the monkey’s motor mirror neurons 
will fire if the monkey sees a hand reach behind a screen in the same manner as the monkey 
would if it had a clear line of sight on the grasping of the object behind the screen. They 
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will only fire in this manner, however, if the monkey has been previously exposed to a 
graspable object behind where the screen is placed. Visually identical actions of the other 
person seem to be implicitly recognized as different because of the different purposes of the 
actions (Umilta, Kohler, Gallese, Fogassi, Fadiga, Keysers, & Rizzolatti 2001). Mirroring 
effects in the monkey’s motor system have been found for grasping, manipulating, tearing, 
and holding objects as well as a variety of motions of the monkey’s mouth (cf. Ferrari, 
Gallese, Rizzolatti, & Fogassi 2003). 
 
Since mirror neurons were discovered in monkeys, they have been found in human beings 
as well (cf. Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004; Rizzolatti, Craighero, & Fadiga 2002). 
Experiments showed as early as the nineteen fifties that the motor cortex in humans 
becomes active when a subject is observing an action done by another (Rizzolatti & 
Craighero 2004, 174). Much like the experiments with monkeys, human neurons register 
both select behaviors of others and equivalent activity within oneself. 
 
Two of the functions in which researchers typically implicate human mirror neurons are 
action and goal understanding on the one hand and emotion understanding on the other hand 
(cf. Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2006, 124ff., 173ff.). 
 
Monkey mirror neurons respond to observed behavior by mirroring an action-goal 
composite within the motor system. Human mirror neurons do the same, and, like monkey 
mirror neurons, individual mirror neurons can be very selective in regards to the actions and 
goals to which they respond. A much wider range of actions elicits mirror activity in the 
human brain compared to the monkey, however. Even “meaningless” actions can produce 
mirror activity in humans (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti 2002; Maeda, Kleiner-
Fisman, & Pascual-Leonoe 2002; Strafella & Paus 2000). 
 
Mirroring appears to be involved in emotion understanding and recognition as well. 
Research on disgust (cf. Wicker, Keysers, Plailly, Royet, Gallese, & Rizzolatti 2003), fear 
(cf. Sprengelmeyer, Young, Schroeder, Grossenbacher, Federlein, Buttner, & Przuntek 
1999), pain (cf. Singer, Seymur, O’Doherty, Kaube, Dolan, & Frith 2004), feelings of guilt 
(cf. Blair, Jones, Clark, & Smith 1997), and anger (cf. Lawrence, Calder, McGowan, & 
Grasby 2002) indicates that there are neural areas that are active both when one recognizes 
these states in others and when one expresses or experiences them. Furthermore, when one 
of the mirroring areas for an emotion is damaged, matching deficits emerge for the 
expression, experience, and recognition of that emotion. 
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Mirroring persons is a matter not only of translating sensory information into motor 
equivalents but also of integrating, refining, and schematizing the motor information that 
mirror neurons produce. This result should not be surprising given the way the sensory 
perception of objects works. When one perceives a cup, an initial presentation of various 
local features of the cup is necessary—colors, edges, orientations, luminosity, etc. These 
features have to be bound together into a single object lest one be left understanding a chair 
as a set of edges, orientations and colors and not as a one thing. In sensory perception, the 
inchoate understanding of how a field of local features might go together is often called 
“gist” by neurobiologists of attention (cf. Oliva 2005). One attempts to refine one’s 
understanding of the initial, bottom-up input until the inchoate has become clear enough 
given one’s purposes and capabilities. 
 
Consider an analogy in terms of tuning in a radio station. One begins with an initial pass 
during which one hears a station briefly and confusedly. One guesses what the spot was on 
the dial that had that station and scans the area around that spot turning the knob more 
slowly on consecutive passes until the station’s signal is sufficiently clear. No matter what 
kind of tuning one is doing, when one tunes something in, one begins with a vague sense of 
what the target is and where it might be found within a sensory field. One then devotes 
one’s attention to a smaller and smaller part of the radio dial until one has tuned in the 
station one wants sufficiently for one’s purposes. The guiding of the dial (the “top-down” 
influence) and responsiveness to radio signals (the “bottom-up” process) must work in 
tandem to tune in the station. To the extent that one has experience tuning in stations, 
natural aptitude for tuning, or prior knowledge of the location of one’s station, one is put 
into a position to achieve greater clarity of signal in one’s tuning. 
 
Similarly, when one first sees another person, one’s motor mirror neurons may register only 
the “gist” of their behavior. Continued observation allows one’s mirror neurons to refine 
one’s understanding of what one is looking at by extending the duration of observation. For 
example, having spilled some marinara sauce down his shirt, Charlie may look up at 
Suzanne to see her reaction. Charlie immediately finds himself experiencing Suzanne as a 
person who is looking at him, but her facial expression may at first seem indeterminate 
between smiling and smirking. With continued observation and Suzanne’s unfolding pattern 
of behavior over time, Charlie comes to experience Suzanne as smiling at him, not 
smirking. Both the fuzzy impression of Suzanne’s behavior and the more clear cut 
impression come to Charlie as intuitive insights into Suzanne, but a tuning process was 
necessary to get to that insight. 
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To the best of our knowledge, then, mirror neurons create map-like outputs of the other 
person’s motor behavior and perhaps the other’s emotional and attentional behavior as well. 
A subset of one’s motor system and possibly one’s emotional systems react to the presence 
of bodily movement in another person. The reaction elicited is an approximation of the 
neural behavior revealed by the pattern of the other’s behavior. Then, top-down influences, 
which may include one’s background information and practical interests, condition the 
manner in which one continues to process the movement of the other. Tuning in the mental 
state of the other person likely involves using a template of some sort to focus one’s further 
processing on features and patterns in the behavior of the other that are salient. The tuning 
process may also involve moving and interacting in a manner designed to give one a better 
sense of what the other person is thinking and feeling. 
 
In the tuning facilitated by mirror neurons, one starts with a basic similarity between the 
motor and affective systems of oneself and the other, and one pursues a greater degree of 
similarity along certain lines that are selected for in the tuning process. One selects features 
based on the possible mental states of the other person suggested by one’s initial grasp of 
the other’s behavior coupled with one’s background knowledge and one’s practical 
interests. The mental states suggested by the behavior of the other person can include the 
goal-directedness of an action and what the other person is attending to. 
 
The similarity cultivated between one’s own endogenous systems and those of the other is 
like an evolving map of the other person’s current mental state. One starts with something 
inchoate, something map-like that is primarily useful because it forms the basis for going 
about building a more useful map or model of the other person. One then looks for a match 
between the other’s behavior and specific features one is looking for. This process brings 
into focus some of the features of the other person’s behavior. Which features are brought 
into focus will be partly determined by the possible uses one might have for that 
information in one’s social context. For example, it is likely that one leaves one’s 
understanding of strangers at a fairly undeveloped level unless there is some indication that 
the stranger’s actions and affect may develop in a way that affects oneself (e.g., either a 
flirtatious or a hostile look). 
 
One can think of the basic similarity of motor and affective systems as establishing a 
framework that can host other information much like the spatial similarity of a map can 
allow it to host information through the placement of symbols on the map. For example, if 
some motor state is associated with an attentional state, then perhaps the presence of that 
motor state in the map of the other can allow one to incorporate plausible candidates for the 
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object of attention into one’s map of the other’s behavior much like the placement of dots 
on a rail map allows that map to incorporate information on the location of rail stations. 
 
There are a number of options for thinking about the way in which the output(s) of 
mindreading can be map-like. The simplest way to think about the relationship between the 
different types of information one gains about others is that there is a single map-like 
structure that hosts one’s other information about the other person. Perhaps one’s motor 
mirror neurons establish the basic similarity between self and the other in a way analogous 
to the spatial similarity of a map and all of one’s other information is analogous to symbols 
placed within the map. 
 
Another possibility is that we develop more than one map—perhaps motor, emotional, and 
visual maps. These maps may overlay each other to create a master map much like one 
might combine separate maps of the rail system, roads, and footpaths of a location so as to 
form a master map. One could also think of know-how as replacing the need to overlay the 
distinct maps much like one might have three separate maps of the same area that one can 
use as if they were one map because one has the ability to use all of them individually and 
to cross-reference them when necessary. 
 
If I am right to think about the output of individual mindreading episodes as being map-like 
or having significant map-like components, the next question is what one should think of 
one’s more general knowledge of other persons. When one knows that Harry is somewhat 
dyspeptic during tax season or that Amelia has a wry sense of humor, it is not as if there is 
some one motor or affective state to be mapped. Harry’s dyspepsia and Amelia’s comedic 
impulses are more general characteristics that can be manifested in a variety of ways. One 
expects there to be some relationship between the outputs of particular episodes of social 
interaction and whatever undergirds one’s general sense of another person. Experiences of 
another person should act as grounds for what another person is like, and one expects that 
one of the top-down influences that one brings to bear in tuning in another person is the way 
one has previously experienced him or her to be. 
 
Whatever state allows one to count as having general knowledge of another person, then, 
has a two-way relationship with the map-like outputs of individual interactions. One’s 
general sense of another person shapes the manner in which one attempts to tune in the 
other person. It shapes the way in which one maps the other person, but it does so in light of 
the way one has previously mapped the person. Its content is partly determined by 
mappings, and it needs to be apt for directing further mappings. 
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A useful way of thinking about one’s general sense of a person is that it is model-like in a 
way parallel to the way episodes of interaction create map-like representations. As Giere 
pointed out, one can have more general models the purpose of which is to develop, apply, 
integrate, and evaluate more specific models or maps. The fit or lack of fit of the more 
specific models and maps with the more general model and with the world can cause one to 
adjust or reject the more general model or vice versa. The role of the more general model, 
however, is to embody a unitary understanding of a wide range of phenomena. An increase 
in generality for a model is often accompanied by an increase in abstraction due to the 
diversity in what the more general model must be similar to. 
 
Thinking of one’s knowledge of persons as being registered in maps and models of the other 
person allows one to accommodate some of the concerns and insights of the enactivist. 
Mapping a domain is an active process in which practical interests loom large. It involves 
selecting for features of interest in the tuning process, and often it requires interacting with 
other persons and exploring one’s social environment to put one in a position for greater 
insight. Similarly, modeling the content of one’s mappings of others is an active process in 
which one must weigh one’s different experiences of another person and the various 
features of those experiences. The processes that allow one to have knowledge of persons 
are highly dependent on the know-how necessary to build up these maps and models and 
relate them to each other and to strategies of investigation. 
 
Maps and models are of their very nature selective and partial. Often a map only succeeds in 
communicating the information it does by restricting its scope to the features deemed 
relevant. It should come as no surprise on this account that our mappings and models of 
others can leave a lot of information out, including information that would be obvious if we 
were looking for it. Attempting to explain mapping behavior in terms of propositional 
inferences is bound to over-intellectualize the pragmatic and embodied dimension of map-
use and construction (or else make us out to be irrational for failing to tease out the logical 
implications of the overtly represented sentential items posited as the carrier of 
information). Explicit propositional reasoning can, of course, supplement mapping and 
modeling behavior. Nonetheless, it is not likely that one can reduce such behavior or the 
information that maps make available to propositional attitudes and reasoning. 
 
On the account I am giving, modeling other persons is never solely a matter of sensory 
imagery. Rather, one correlates sensory imagery with maps and models of the other 
person’s endogenous states, including mental states of emotion, attention, and intention that 
may condition one’s pattern of behavior. Maps and models of the other person will lead one 
to have sensorimotor expectations concerning how an interaction with the other person 
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should or could unfold. Possessing maps and models of one’s social environment grounds 
one’s social instincts. Social cognition, however, is more than a mere reflex or instinct. It is 
the ability to navigate the world by building up a sense of how things stand out there in the 
world of persons relative to our practical interests. That project is hard to make sense of, 
however, without an appeal to something representational.  
 
In conclusion, though enactivism should draw our attention to the role of activity, 
interaction, and know-how in the knowledge of persons, there should be nothing suspect in 
speaking of social cognition in representational terms. It is plausible, based on our current 
state of empirical knowledge, that social cognition produces map-like and model-like 
outputs. Plausibly, coming to know another person is not a matter of merely learning to 
react to behavior in a reflexive manner; it is gradually developing a more insightful and 
useful model of who the other person is. 
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Notes 
 
1 For good book-length presentations of some other enactivist perspectives, see also Gallagher 2005 and Noe 
2006. 
 
2 Hutto’s own preference is to focus on the phrase “folk psychology”, but he uses “mindreading” as something 
equivalent to employing folk psychology throughout his book. In the preface alone, see the uses of 
mindreading on pp, ix, xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, and xvii. 
 
3  “I . . . provide a detailed account of intentional attitudes in terms of a thoroughly noncognitivist, 
nonrepresentationalist understanding intentionality—one that regards embodied, enactive modes of responding 
as basic and sees symbolic thinking as the preserve of those beings that have appropriately mastered certain 
sophisticated linguistic constructions and practices. This matters because only those that have achieved the 
latter are in a position to have and to understand bona fide propositional attitudes” (Hutto 2008, xiii). Notice 
that Hutto runs together representations, propositional attitudes, and language. 
 
4 It is worth pointing out, however, that one could have an account of mindreading rooted in a hierarchy of 
map-like and model-like information structures while being skeptical about the role that mirror neurons play. 
